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THE PROPER APPROACH FOR TAXING
THE INCOME OF FOREIGN CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS
Robert J. Peroni
Professor H. David Rosenbloom has written a provocative
and thoughtful paper on international tax reform,' which proposes a limited exemption system for foreign business profits
attributable to permanent establishments in certain specific
foreign countries having comprehensive rules of income taxation (hereinafter referred to as "listed foreign countries"). His
exemption proposal, if adopted in its purest form, would alter
substantially our current international tax rules by eliminating
the foreign tax credit provisions as well as the anti-deferral regimes of current law. His proposal would exempt from U.S.
income tax a U.S. person's business profits attributable to
permanent establishments in listed foreign countries. He
would end deferral completely for the income earned by certain
U.S. shareholders through controlled foreign corporations by
disregarding the foreign corporation for tax purposes. Such
income would be exempt from U.S. income tax if in the nature
of business profits attributable to permanent establishments in
listed foreign countries. All other foreign source income, including foreign business profits not eligible for the exemption system, as well as all foreign source passive income, would be

* Robert Kramer Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. Copyright © 2001 by Robert J. Peroni. All rights reserved.
The author thanks J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. and Stephen Shay, for the many discussions that we have had on various aspects of anti-deferral reform and other international tax policy issues in preparing our jointly-authored works on anti-deferral reform. This response to David Rosenbloom's paper draws in part from the
ideas presented in those works (cited in footnote 3 below), in my earlier article
published in the Miami Law Review (also cited in footnote 3 below), and in a
response that I prepared, Robert J. Peroni, Deferral of U.S. Tax on International
Income: End It, Don't Mend It-Why Should We Be Stuck in the Middle With
Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1609 (2001), to a paper authored by Keith Engel, Tax
Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck in the
Middle With Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1658 (2001), and was discussed at a
University of Texas Law School Roundtable on November 3, 2000.
1. H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom Up: Taxing the Income of Foreign
Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1525 (2001) [hereinafter Rosenbloom
Paper].
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taxable currently to U.S. persons if such income were earned
directly, through a partnership, limited liability company, or
other entity that is treated as transparent for federal income
tax purposes, or through a ten-percent-or-more interest (i.e., a
"United States shareholder," as defined in section 951(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code) in a controlled foreign corporation (as
defined in section 957). International double taxation would be
mitigated through a deduction (rather than a credit) for foreign
taxes paid on the taxable foreign source income not qualifying
for *the exemption system. Professor Rosenbloom's exemption
proposal is based on considerations of equity, efficiency, and
complexity, rather than concerns about capital import neutrality/international competitiveness and the alleged need for U.S.
multinationals to be provided with special tax treatment of foreign source income in order to be able to successfully compete
in the global economy. His proposal attempts to balance his
seeming preference (based on equity and efficiency considerations) for a residence-based, capital export neutral international tax system,2 with the need for a substantial reduction in
the complexity of the international tax rules. In the end, he is
willing to tolerate some significant equity and efficiency losses
in order to achieve what he hopes will be even more substantial simplicity gains.
My overall assessment is that this is a proposal worthy of
careful and serious consideration. As should be clear from my
prior publications,3 I share Professor Rosenbloom's preference
for a residence-based, capital export neutral international tax
system and I agree with his unassailable premise that properly
designed tax rules must take into account and balance concerns about equity, efficiency, and complexity. I probably would

2. Professor Rosenbloom eschews the use of the term "capital export neutrality" (calling it a "banality") to describe the theory that underlies his proposal. See
Rosenbloom, supra note 1, at 1531. But much of the analysis on pages 1534
through 1541 of his paper would be more consistent with capital export neutrality
than with capital import neutrality. See id. at 1534-41.
3. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay,
Deferral: Consider Ending It, Instead of Expanding It, 86 TAX NOTEs 837 (2000)
(also published as An Alternative View of Deferral: Considering a Proposal to Curtail, Not Expand, Deferral, 20 TAX NoTEs INTL 547 (2000)); Robert J. Peroni, Back
to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. InternationalIncome Tax
Rules, 51 U. MAMI L. REV. 975 (1997); Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. &
Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign
Source Income, 52 SMU L. REv. 455 (1999).
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strike the balance more in the direction of equity and efficiency
than Professor Rosenbloom would, but we are in substantial
agreement on our underlying premises. I also share Professor
Rosenbloom's belief that the time has come for serious consideration of a radical overhaul of our international tax rules;
particularly those relating to deferral and the foreign tax credit
provisions.4 As discussed below, while my first choice would be
a different overhaul than the one that Professor Rosenbloom
proposes, my second choice would not be the status quo (even if
incrementally improved). Instead, I would favor a carefully
designed, non-elective exemption system. In my mind, the
current, incoherent compromise between capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality that is reflected in the
absurdly complicated and ineffective subpart F rules is not an
acceptable option in the 21st Century. Moreover, the subpart F
provisions are beyond repair and no amount of incremental
tinkering will fix them. Instead, it is time to consider seriously
tearing those rules out from their roots and replacing them
with something new.
I start my own analysis of the proper tax treatment of
foreign controlled corporations with the belief that the primary
function of the income tax system (including the international
tax provisions) should be to raise revenue for the government's
direct expenditure programs in an equitable and efficient manner.5 I recognize, however, that complexity concerns require
some sacrifice of fairness and efficiency concerns. Stated differently, I believe that tax rules generally should attempt to define the income tax base so as to distribute the tax burden
based on ability-to-pay considerations and should neither favor
nor disfavor foreign business and investment activities.' I am,
therefore, quite skeptical of tax provisions that are designed to
favor one type of economic activity or investment over another

4. In its recently-released study of Subpart F, the Treasury Department
made no specific recommendation concerning the reform of Subpart F, but did note
that Subpart F needs to be revised to deal with the modem forms of commerce
and with the gaps in its current coverage. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, THE DEFERRAL
OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY
98-99 (2000) thereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEPVT, DEFERRAL STUDY].
5. See Robert J. Peroni, Deferral of U.S. Tax on InternationalIncome: End It,
Don't Mend It-Why Should We Be Stuck in the Middle With Subpart F, 79 TEX.
L. REv. 1609 (2001).
6. See id.
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type of economic activity or investment, and skeptical of claims
that any particular type of economic activity needs special tax
treatment in order to compete effectively in the marketplace!
Absent compelling policy considerations to the contrary,
tax rules should not be formulated to direct the allocation of
economic resources to one economic activity rather than another, and the federal income tax system should not be in the
business of picking winners and losers in terms of business
and investment choices, including decisions concerning the
location (domestic or foreign) of such businesses and investments.' In the international tax context, this means that if the
pre-tax economic return on an investment abroad exceeds the
pre-tax economic return on an investment in the United
States, then economic efficiency generally is increased by a
taxpayer's decision to move some of her investments abroad
and the international tax rules should not interfere with that
decision. Accordingly, the central function of the international
tax rules should be to attempt to ensure that double taxation
(a tax on the same income by both the residence country and
the source country) does not discourage the taxpayer from
engaging in a cross-border transaction if it makes economic
sense to do so." On the other hand, if the pre-tax economic
return on a foreign investment is lower than the pre-tax economic return on an investment in the United States, then
economic efficiency generally is promoted by a taxpayer's decision to keep the investment activity in the United States, and
the international tax rules should not provide an incentive for
the taxpayer to shift the investment to the foreign country by
providing a preferential tax treatment of income earned in the
foreign country." An international tax system based on the
capital export neutrality norm generally seems to have less
distortive effects on economic behavior than one based on the
capital import neutrality norm because the taxpayer pays the
same total tax (domestic and foreign), regardless of whether
she invests at home or abroad, at least in the circumstance
where the source country's tax rate does not exceed the resi-

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
Peroni, supra note 5.
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dence country's tax rate. 2 Thus, in an international tax system based on the capital export neutrality norm, economic
considerations, rather than tax considerations, primarily will
drive a taxpayer's choice of location (domestic or foreign) for
investment. 3
By contrast, an international tax system based on the
capital import neutrality norm encourages a taxpayer to locate
investments and business activities in foreign countries that
impose low rates of tax and encourages source countries to
offer tax incentives in order to attract the investments of such
a taxpayer.'4 In other words, capital import neutrality encourages taxpayers to place a premium on tax considerations in
determining where to locate an investment. 5 In fact, the proponents of capital import neutrality often argue that the residence country must exempt domestic persons from tax on foreign source income in order for those persons to be able to
compete in the country of source. 6 Under an international tax

12. See id. I am not a capital export neutrality purist because I support the
longstanding provisions of U.S. tax law that limit a taxpayer's allowable foreign
tax credit to the taxpayer's pre-foreign tax credit U.S. tax liability on the foreign
source income. See id. By contrast, pure capital export neutrality theory would
hold that a taxpayer should be allowed to take a foreign tax credit for creditable
foreign taxes even if the credit exceeds the taxpayer's pre-foreign tax credit U.S.
tax liability on the foreign source income. See id. The United States has a legitimate interest in preserving its taxing jurisdiction over U.S. source income and
granting a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes in excess of the taxpayer's pre-foreign tax credit U.S. tax liability on foreign source income would be tantamount to
allowing a foreign tax credit to offset U.S. tax liability on U.S. source income. See
id. In addition, the primary function of the foreign tax credit is to ameliorate
international double taxation and no double taxation exists to the extent that the
foreign tax exceeds the taxpayer's U.S. tax liability on the foreign source income.
See id. Finally, allowing a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes in excess of the U.S.
tax rate would provide an incentive for source countries to impose taxes on U.S.
persons in excess of the U.S. rate, without suffering the adverse consequences of
loss of foreign investment. See, e.g., Donald J. Rousslang, Deferral and the Optimal
Taxation of International Investment Income, 53 NATL TAX J. 589, 597 (2000)
[hereinafter Rousslang, Deferral].
13. See Peroni, supra note 5.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. Taken to its logical extreme, this competitiveness argument would
suggest that if a foreign company that competes with U.S. taxpayers in U.S. markets is able to obtain tax preferences from its country of residence that exempt it
from tax on foreign source earnings and it pays no tax in the United States by
reason of a tax treaty (i.e., its U.S. business is not conducted through a permanent establishment because the products are shipped into the United States from
abroad), the United States should exempt the U.S. taxpayer from U.S. tax on the
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system based on capital import neutrality, a rationally acting
domestic taxpayer will choose to locate an investment in a
source foreign country offering a low tax rate even if that investment bears an economic return lower than an equivalent
amount of investment in the home country that is fully taxable, provided that the difference in economic rate of return is
less than the difference in home country and source country
tax rates.' Moreover, if the deferral period is long enough,
deferral is nearly as beneficial as exemption and will have
nearly the same distortive effects as fully exempting the foreign source income from the residence country's tax base."8 It
is important to note that deferral is a problem even if the taxpayer is engaged in real business activity in the low-tax foreign country, because the existence of the deferral privilege
encourages the taxpayer to shift investments to the low-tax
country even if those investments provide a lower pre-tax economic return than investments in the residence country or
some other foreign country with higher tax rates.19
Because capital import neutrality/competitiveness proponents are arguing for preferential tax rules for foreign source
business income (in the form of either an exemption of such
income from the federal income tax base or, its possible economic equivalent, deferral of U.S. tax on the income if it is
earned through a foreign corporation), they should bear a
heavy burden of justifying this special treatment. 0 To satisfy
that burden they need to do something more than merely repeat unsupported claims that Subpart F and other features of
the U.S. international tax system adversely affect the ability of
U.S. multinationals to compete in the global marketplace.2 '

sale of its products in the United States that compete with the foreign competitor.
This would be an absurd argument that presumably would be rejected by a sensible Congress. What then if so special about foreign source income that justifies
acceptance of the argument if the U.S. taxpayer is seeking exemption from U.S.
tax on its foreign source income for the same reason?
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Peroni, supra note 5. However, under certain circumstances, deferral
of a residence-based tax on foreign source profits can enhance economic efficiency.
See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral:A Deferential Reconsideration, 52 NATL TAX J. 385 (1999). See generally Rosanne Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, 87 TAx NOTEs 255 (2000).
20. See Peroni, supra note 5.
21. See id. The National Foreign Trade Council's "study" of the international
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To date, the proponents of capital import neutrality/competitiveness have not satisfied this burden and they are
not likely to be able to do so in the future.2 2
The current U.S. international tax rules dealing with deferral (particularly subpart F) represent a compromise between
these concerns that in the end, of course, satisfies almost no
one. These provisions raise a relatively small amount of revenue and whatever revenue they raise is only at substantial
administrative costs by the government and compliance costs
by taxpayers because of the substantial complexity they add to
the Internal Revenue Code. The rules target certain types of
foreign source income (primarily passive income and so-called
foreign base company transactions) but leave in place deferral
of U.S. tax for most types of foreign business income earned
through foreign corporations, thus preserving the distortive
effects of deferral on location choice for business and investment activities.2" The dividing lines in subpart F between

tax rules, THE NFTC FOREIGN INCoME PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY-PART ONE: A RECONSIDERATION OF SUBPART F (1999), is an
example of a report that promises much more than it delivers in terms of support
for the competitiveness concerns of U.S. multinationals. This well-written report,
prepared by some of the best and brightest international tax specialists in the
United States, offers mostly anecdotes (labeled "industry case studies") about supposed competitiveness problems in certain industries by U.S. multinationals caused
by the Subpart F provisions. It certainly does- not provide the strong empirical
support necessary to support its conclusion that "Changes in the international
economic environment, as well as refinements in the theory of international taxation, support a shift in the balance of U.S. international tax policy towards competitiveness and away from capital export neutrality." Id. at xxi. For critiques of
the NFTC study, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Competition and Competitiveness: Review of the NFTC Subpart F Report, 83 TAX NOTEs 582 (1999); Fleming, Peroni &
Shay, supra note 3. For a spirited defense of the NFTC report by one of its authors, see Peter R. Merrill, A Response to Professor Avi-Yonah on Subpart F, 83
TAX NOTES 1802 (1999).
22. See, e.g., Peroni, supra note 5; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 3, at
469-70, 838. See also U.S. TREAS. DEPVt, DEFERRAL STUDY, supra note 4, at 57-61.
23. In addition to the failure of the Subpart F compromise to deal adequately
with the policy problems arising from the deferral privilege, there are various
structural imperfections in the constructive dividend mechanism used by Subpart F
to curtail deferral. See, e.g., Peroni, supra note 5; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra
note 3, at 507-10, 847-48, 986-94. First, the Subpart F inclusions are treated as
ordinary income, without regard to the character of the underlying income that
the foreign corporation earns. See id. Second, instead of the U.S. shareholder obtaining a direct foreign tax credit for the shareholder's share of foreign taxes paid
by the foreign corporation, as would be the case under a pass-through regime, the
pass-through of foreign tax credits to the foreign corporation's U.S. corporate
shareholders are determined under the complex rules of Sections 960 and 902 and
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"good" and "bad" deferral may or may not have made sense in
1962, when the provisions were originally drafted. They make
little sense in a U.S. and world economy with much increased
international trade and "new economy" industries conducting
transactions that do not fit easily into the subpart F framework. These rules distort choice of entity decisions by favoring
use of a branch for loss-producing activities and of a foreign
corporation for income-producing activities in low-tax foreign
countries. They distort repatriation decisions by foreign corporations with respect to low-taxed foreign earnings qualifying
for deferral because the foreign corporation is encouraged to
retain the earnings abroad, rather than distribute them to a
U.S. shareholder and trigger U.S. income taxation on the repatriation. Further, when Congress or the Treasury Department
actually comes up with a change to the anti-deferral rules that
cuts back on deferral (such as the excess passive assets rules
in section 956A, the overlap between the subpart F and passive foreign investment company regimes, or the hybrid branch
regulations issued by the Treasury Department), the U.S.
multinationals and their advocates successfully lobby to repeal
or eviscerate the anti-deferral change.
In essence, the anti-deferral rules of current law, working
together with a foreign tax credit limitation regime that allows
liberal cross-crediting of high- and low-taxed foreign source
income (notwithstanding the basket limitations in section
904(d)), create a poorly designed, elective exemption system for
the well-advised taxpayer and numerous traps for the unwary
taxpayer. These provisions violate equity, efficiency, and complexity criteria and, working together with the cross-crediting
allowed under the foreign tax credit limitations, effectively
may impose less U.S. income tax on foreign source income than
would a properly designed, non-elective exemption system (i.e.,
in some cases, they create a negative tax on foreign source
income).' Thus, I see nothing so compelling about the

generally only U.S. corporate shareholders owning at least 10 percent of the voting
stock of the foreign corporation are entitled to claim such credits. See id. Third,
losses of the controlled foreign corporation do not pass through to its shareholders
under Subpart F. See id.
24. Harry Grubert and John Mutti estimate that the current rules create a
negative average effective U.S. tax rate on active foreign earnings underlying dividends of non-financial controlled foreign corporations. See Harry Grubert & John
Mutti, Dividend Exemption Versus the Current System for Taxing Foreign Business
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subpart F compromise that we should continue trying to fix it
with tinkering instead of repealing it and trying something
else.'
My strong preference would be to attempt to reform the
international tax system to bring it closer to the capital export
neutrality norm, but with correction of the defects in the current foreign tax credit rules that effectively create a negative
effective U.S. tax rate on certain types of foreign source income. I would end deferral completely and would include in
gross income currently all foreign source income earned by
U.S. persons, whether directly or through a foreign corporation." I would repeal the foreign earned income exclusion and
preferential tax regimes such as the FSC provisions in whatever form they appear. I would repeal the export source rule for
inventory property. I would replace the basket limitations on
the foreign tax credit in current law with a per-country limitation containing only two basket limitations: passive income
and all other foreign source income. Finally, I would abandon
the "technical taxpayer" rule for determining who is entitled to
foreign tax credits for gross basis withholding taxes on passivetype income.
However, if we could not accomplish reform along the lines
discussed above, then, as a second-best alternative, I would be
willing to consider a carefully designed exemption system as a
way of radically reforming the current international tax system. I think that Professor Rosenbloom's proposal for a targeted exemption system gives us a good starting point for designing an appropriate exemption system.27
First, I think that the theory underlying the exemption
system is important because that theory will help determine
the contours of the system and will help guide courts and tax

Income (cited and discussed in Rousslang, Deferral, supra note 12, at 596). Donald
Rousslang points out that the export source rule for inventory property sold
abroad, combined with the cross-crediting opportunities under the foreign tax credit limitations, creates a negative U.S. tax on the foreign source income from such
property. See Donald J. Rousslang, The Sales Source Rules for U.S. Exports: How
Much Do They Cost?, 8 TAx NOTEs INTL 527 (1994). See also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
DEFERRAL STUDY, supra note 4, at 46.
25. But see U.S. TREAS. DEPT, DEFERRAL STUDY, supra note 4, at 98.
26. See supra articles cited in note 3.
27. For another good attempt at designing an exemption system, see Grubert
& Mutti, supra note 24.
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administrators in interpreting and applying the exemption
provisions. Accordingly, I believe that it is important that
Professor Rosenbloom's exemption proposal is not based on
international competitiveness concerns, since, as discussed
above, I believe that the proponents of those concerns have not
come close to proving the link between those concerns and the
need to provide special tax rules for foreign source income.
Instead, Professor Rosenbloom's proposal is, in essence, a second-best approach to dealing with capital export neutrality
concerns in the light of the difficulties in trying to end deferral
completely and the complex rules needed to protect the residence country's tax base in a foreign tax credit system that
must be applied to income earned not only directly and but
through foreign corporations and that cannot effectively prevent all cross-crediting.
Second, it is important that Professor Rosenbloom's exemption system incorporates the principle, that for purposes of
the international tax rules, a foreign corporation is to be treated as transparent with respect to its shareholders, at least if it
is controlled by U.S. persons. Disregard of the foreign corporate form in this context is long overdue, particularly in the
light of the ease with which a taxpayer can elect whether to
have a foreign entity treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. However, I would go further and disregard
the corporate form even in the non-controlled foreign corporation situation, at least if the U.S. person owns ten percent of
the voting power of the entity. The ten-percent threshold is
used in several places in the Code to distinguish between situations in which the U.S. person is treated as holding a mere
portfolio interest in a foreign corporation and those in which
the corporate interest is treated as a direct investment by the
U.S. person abroad. In other words, the indirect credit provisions in Section 902, and the look-through rules for non-controlled section 902 corporations in section 904(d)(4), in essence,
both treat the foreign corporation as transparent with respect
to its ten-percent-or-more U.S. shareholders, even though U.S.
shareholders as a group do not control the foreign corporation.28 Sections 902 and 904(d)(4) also presume that a ten-

28. In any event, a U.S. shareholder's less-than-50 percent, but more-than-10
percent, stock interest in a foreign corporation will often give the U.S. shareholder
considerable influence over the financial affairs of the foreign corporation, regard-
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percent-or-more U.S. shareholder will be in a position to obtain
the necessary information concerning the foreign corporation's
earnings and foreign taxes in order to determine in what basket dividends from the corporation should fall and to compute
the deemed paid credit. Moreover, in the case of below-tenpercent U.S. shareholders of foreign corporations, some approach for recapturing the benefits of deferral is necessary in
order to prevent tax avoidance. In this regard, a modified version of the passive foreign investment company rules probably
is necessary, allowing the under-ten-percent-shareholder to
obtain deferral, while requiring a later payback of the benefits
of deferral through an interest charge.
Third, it is important that Professor Rosenbloom's proposed exemption system is not elective and would remove
much electivity from the international tax rules. Losses attributable to income earned in the exempt countries would be
disallowed; whether earned directly or through a controlled
foreign corporation. Moreover, the abuses arising under the
foreign tax credit rules of current law would be eliminated
because Professor Rosenbloom's proposal would include a repeal of the foreign tax credit provisions even with respect to
foreign taxes paid or accrued on foreign source income not
falling within the proposed exemption regime. As discussed
above, the current elective deferral system, combined with a
foreign tax credit system that allows a great deal of cross-crediting, essentially is an elective exemption system, but one that
is only available with considerable planning.
Fourth, it is important that Professor Rosenbloom would
limit his exemption approach to active business income earned
only in countries with fully developed income tax rules. Thus,
his exemption system would not contain an incentive for U.S.

less of the country of residence of the corporation's other shareholders. See Peroni,
supra note 5. Thus, using the definition of controlled foreign corporation in Section
957 as the dividing line for whether or not the foreign corporate form will be
disregarded does not seem appropriate. It will perpetuate a choice-of-entity bias in
the existing international tax rules regarding h6w a U.S. person's significant, but
non-controlling, interest in a joint venture with foreign persons-the non-corporate
form-will be used in the early years to take advantage of the pass-through of
losses to offset the taxpayer's other income (including U.S. source income) and the
corporate form will be used in later years when the venture is producing profits,
particularly if those profits are earned in a low-tax foreign country. But see I.R.C.
§ 367(a)(3)(C).
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taxpayers to locate their business or investment activities in
low-tax or no-tax foreign jurisdictions.
Finally, the proposed exemption approach, particularly if
enacted in its purest form, could achieve significant simplification of the international tax rules, leading to lower compliance
costs for U.S. taxpayers and lower administrative costs for the
U.S. government. The anti-deferral regimes and foreign tax
credit provisions would be eliminated. This exemption system
would reduce somewhat the pressure on the source-of-income,
allocation-and-apportion-of-deduction,
and transfer pricing
rules; except with respect to taxpayers having activities in
listed foreign countries. In which event, the pressures on the
source-of-income, deduction-allocation, and transfer pricing
rules would remain, if not be intensified, although in the context of a determination of the business profits attributable to a
permanent establishment in the listed foreign country.
I do have some problems with Professor Rosenbloom's
proposal. First, I am concerned that by eliminating the foreign
tax credit provisions and allowing only a deduction for foreign
taxes paid on active business income earned in countries not
on the list of exempt countries, equity and efficiency principles
are substantially compromised. Stated differently, a deduction
for foreign taxes in such a situation does not mitigate adequately international double taxation and, thus, would serve to
discourage otherwise economically efficient transactions from
taking place. Having said that, if his proposal were modified to
allow a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid on such nonexempt income, a substantial amount of the simplification
gains from this exemption proposal would be lost.
Second, I believe that Professor Rosenbloom recognizes,
but underestimates, the intense pressure that would be placed
on the United States or other residence country to expand its
list of listed foreign countries beyond those that serve the intended purpose of the proposal. One can safely predict that
representatives of U.S. multinationals will place strong lobbying pressure on Congress to include on the list low-tax or notax foreign jurisdictions on the ground that exemption from
U.S. tax on the business profits in those countries is necessary
in order for U.S. multinationals to be able to compete with
their competitors from foreign countries with more liberal
exemption systems. Thus, vigilance in protecting the list of
designated exempt foreign countries would be crucial to pre-
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serving the integrity of this exemption proposal. Given the
financial strength of the lobbying groups in favor of capital
import neutrality, maintaining such vigilance will not be easy.
Third, by using a targeted country approach to determining where the exemption system would apply, this proposal
likely would lead to greater use of the international tax provisions by Congress and the Executive Branch to punish countries whose political, trade, or other non-tax system-related
behavior is not to our liking. This tendency is already exhibited in the current international tax rules, in provisions such as
sections 901(j) and 908. But, by drawing a sharp line between
those foreign jurisdictions in which the exemption system
would apply and all other countries, the temptation to use the
exemption country list to reward or punish non-tax systemrelated behavior by foreign countries would be intense. This is
not an appropriate use of the tax system without subjecting
the tax penalty provision to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. It
complicates the Code and has the wrong government agency
(the IRS) in charge of administering the penalty program.
Stated differently, the Internal Revenue Code is generally not
the appropriate vehicle for conducting a foreign relations program by the U.S. Government and Professor Rosenbloom's
exemption proposal might well lead to a greater use of the international tax rules in this way.
Finally, as is true of all radical changes in the tax law,
Professor Rosenbloom's proposal would require complicated
transition rules. In addition, many details (including some
important definitional rules) and collateral consequences of the
proposal remain to be thought out and worked out. However,
none of these should be viewed as insurmountable obstacles to
enactment of the proposal, if we decided that this type of exemption system is the right pathway to reform of the U.S.
international tax rules.
In conclusion, for many years, we have tried to seek a
balance between capital export neutrality and capital import
neutrality concerns in the design of the U.S. international tax
rules. That approach predictably has produced an incoherent
system of elective deferral combined with a complex set of foreign tax credit provisions, which still permit too much crosscrediting of high and low foreign taxes on foreign business
income. Part and parcel of this incoherent system are the
subpart F provisions, which fail to substantially cut back on
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deferral (except in the case of passive income and certain types
of base company, transactions), and yet add tremendous complexity to the Internal Revenue Code.' Further, tinkering
with the current anti-deferral regimes by adding more rules to
subpart F, that target particular transactions based on the
type of income involved or that attempt to update the subpart
F rules in the light of the modern technology-based economy to
accommodate the concerns of capital export neutrality proponents or adding additional exceptions to the definition of
subpart F income to accommodate the concerns of capital import neutrality proponents is not the answer. Instead, radical
overhaul of the U.S. international tax rules is in order.
Ultimately, I believe that the competitiveness of the U.S.
tax system will be improved by broadening the tax base by
bringing into it all income that is realized by a U.S. person,
including foreign source income earned through a foreign corporation, thereby removing distortions in the tax system that
favor or disfavor particular types of income based on its geographical source." As a result of this base broadening, marginal tax rates should be cut for all income across the board.3
Stated differently, instead of enacting a capital-import-neutrality-based exemption system that cuts the tax rate on foreign
source business income to zero, we should broaden the tax base
to include all foreign source income earned by U.S. persons
and cut the tax rates on all income, without regard to
source.32 To accomplish this, we should end deferral completely on income earned by U.S. persons through a foreign corporation, whether by treating the foreign corporation as a passthrough entity with respect to U.S. persons who own stock in it
(my preferred approach) or through some other mechanism.3 3
It also means that the foreign tax credit provisions need to be
changed by replacing the current basket limitations in section
904(d) with a per-country limitation, with two categories: passive income and all other foreign source income, and making
certain other changes to the foreign tax credit rules. On the
other hand, if we determine that it is too difficult to enforce

29. See Peroni, supra note 5.

30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
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residence-based taxation through a system that ends deferral
completely and uses a per-country foreign tax credit system,
then we should consider moving to a carefully designed exemption system.
In other words, my first choice would be to revise substantially the U.S. international tax rules based on a capital export
neutrality approach. 34 But, if we lack the political will to
achieve that type of reform, my second choice would not be
maintaining the status quo of the current incoherent U.S.
international tax system that is tantamount to a poorly designed, elective exemption system.35 Instead, I would rather
see the United States consider adopting an exemption system
that is not elective and that is not based on the largely unproven claims of capital import neutrality/competitiveness theorists. In other words, we should at least take a serious look at
attempting to design a coherent exemption system that does
not serve as an incentive for U.S. taxpayers to divert investments to low-tax foreign countries and that attempts to balance concerns about fairness, economic efficiency, and complexity.3" Professor Rosenbloom's paper has given us a proposal
that provides a good starting point for at least one version of
such a system.

34. See id.
35. See Peroni, supra note 5.
36. See id.

